论文部分内容阅读
本文首先提出村民自治就是上级利益、村民利益与村干部自身利益的“三元利益”博弈的过程。然后从现实案例出发,以激励控制手段为分析视角,阐述了在村财乡管以后,在村干部选举与任职阶段,广大村民与上级部门“错位博弈”现状。最后提出用“双评议”的办法对村干部进行“反控制”是破解村民自治困境、创新农村基层社会管理的关键。
This paper first proposes that villagers’ autonomy is the process of the game of “tripartite interest” of superior interests, villagers’ interests and village cadres’ own interests. Then from the realistic case, taking the incentive control method as the analysis angle of view, this article elaborates the status quo of “dislocation game” between villagers and their superiors in the village cadres’ election and tenure after the village finance and administration. Finally, it is proposed that “anti-controlling” village cadres by using “double criticism” is the key to solving the predicament of villagers’ autonomy and innovating the social management of rural grass-roots units.