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在分析流域生态补偿中水源地和受水区行为选择机理的基础上,利用监督博弈模型推导出双方行为选择的临界条件。研究结果表明,在其他条件不变的情况下,流域水源地的败德行为将随水源地违约超常收益的增大、生态建设机会成本的增加和其冒险意识的增大而放纵,随违约惩罚和生态补偿额度的增大而收敛;受水区的监督行为会随受水区监督成本的增加及冒险程度的提高而强化,随违约惩罚、违约对受水区造成潜在损失的加重而弱化。
On the basis of analyzing the mechanism of water source and receiving area behavior in ecological compensation of watershed, the author uses the supervised game model to deduce the critical conditions for the behavior selection of both parties. The results show that, under the condition of other conditions remain unchanged, the moral hazard of the water source areas of the basin will be indulged with the abnormal income of the water source violation, the opportunity cost of ecological construction and the increase of their risk awareness, with penalty of breach of contract And the ecological compensation quota increases. The supervised behavior of water-receiving areas will be strengthened with the increase of monitoring costs and risk-taking of water areas. With the penalty of breach of contract, the default will be weakened by the increase of potential losses caused by water-receiving areas.