随着我国经济体制改革的深化和现代企业制度的建立和完善,国有企业的经营和管理的薄弱环节就在于对经营者的长期激励。国有企业是我国国民经济的骨干力量,并始终控制国家的经济,中国一直把国有企业的改革放在中心位置股权激励作为一种薪酬激励制度在国有企业,提别是在国有上市公司当中开始尝试,借鉴外国成功经验肯定股票期权的激励作用,对经营者的长期激励对企业的长期发展有着决定性的影响,股票期权无疑是解决这一问题的有效方式。本文在对股权激励的相关理论依据及其应用进行讨论和分析的基础上展开,通过实证分析股权激励对我国国有上市公司的绩效影响,并根据实证分析的结果找出影响公司绩效的深层原因。针对研究结果,探讨了现代企业当中绩效与激励机制的关系和问题,并提出了相应的建议,着重以国有企业为例,探讨了国有企业激励机制改革当中出现的一些列问题,和解决对策。 With the deepening of China’s economic reform and the establishment and improvement of the modern enterprise system, the weak link in the management and operation of state-owned enterprises lies in the long-term incentives to managers. State-owned enterprises are the backbone of China’s national economy and always control the economy of the country. China has always placed the reform of state-owned enterprises at the center. Equity Incentives As a system of compensation incentives in state-owned enterprises, Tieshi is trying to establish a state-owned listed company , Learn from the successful experience of foreign countries to confirm the incentive role of stock options, the long-term incentive for managers have a decisive impact on the long-term development of enterprises, stock options is undoubtedly an effective way to solve this problem. Based on the discussion and analysis of the relevant theoretical basis and application of equity incentive, this paper empirically analyzes the impact of equity incentive on the performance of state-owned listed companies in our country, and finds out the underlying causes of corporate performance based on the results of empirical analysis. In view of the research results, this paper discusses the relationship and problems between performance and incentive mechanism among modern enterprises, and puts forward some corresponding suggestions. Emphatically taking state-owned enterprises as an example, this paper discusses some problems that arise in the reform of state-owned enterprises’ incentive mechanism and their countermeasures.