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本文认为,进入权理论为公司治理研究提供了一个新的视角,它使得我们对公司治理的理解更贴近于管理实践,但是,进入权自身的机会性使得进入权的配置机制中充满不确定,以至于它无法像设计的那样有效塑造当事人事后的讨价还价能力。不确定来自于:①关键资源的特征。关键资源应该是一束可分割的权利集,即使是一束虚拟的权利集;②对人力资本专用性投资的计量,包括对人力资本专用性投资程度的计量和对人力资本专用性投资绩效的计量。如果不能克服进入权的机会性所引致的不确定,它很可能只是一种可用于指导公司治理实践的思维方式,而不能成为公司治理的理论基础,至少现阶段如此。
This article holds that the theory of access rights provides a new perspective for the study of corporate governance, which makes us understand the corporate governance closer to management practices. However, the opportunity of access itself makes the allocation mechanism of access rights full of uncertainty, So that it can not effectively shape the party’s bargaining power as designed. Uncertainty comes from: ① the characteristics of key resources. The key resource should be a set of divisible rights, even if it is a bundle of virtual rights. ② The measurement of the specific investment of human capital, including the measurement of the specific investment of human capital and the performance of the special investment of human capital Measurement. Without uncertainty over the opportunities for access, it may well be just a way of thinking that can be used to guide corporate governance practices, not the rationale for corporate governance, at least at this stage.