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本文旨在论述康德的法权学说在他的整个哲学体系中的位置,尤其是在他的道德形而上学体系中的位置。在目前康德学界,有关该问题存在两种对立立场:一种立场认为法权学说属于道德形而上学,另一种立场认为法权学说可脱离道德形而上学而自成一个独立部分。本文通过康德有关“批判”和“形而上学”的划分而指出,法权学说并不纯粹属于道德形而上学,它因为要依赖于某些人类学假设而在某种程度上超出了道德形而上学。
This article aims to discuss the position of Kant’s legal doctrine in his entire philosophical system, especially in his system of moral metaphysics. At present, there are two kinds of opposing stances on the issue in Kant’s academic field: one holds that legal doctrine belongs to moral metaphysics and the other holds that legal doctrine can be separated from moral metaphysics and form a separate part. This paper points out that the doctrine of legal rights does not belong solely to the moral metaphysics because it depends on certain anthropological assumptions to a certain extent goes beyond moral metaphysics .