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根据公司实际控制人取得控制权途径的不同,参考企业两权分离程度的现实差异,可将企业控制类型分为企业家控制类型与资本家控制类型。文献研究表明,控制类型与企业绩效并非简单相关,其中可能包含一些变量的中介传导作用。因此,本文基于企业家理论与委托代理理论,以企业投资行为作为中介变量,选取了在沪深A股上市的177家家族企业2010—2014年的面板数据为样本,对控制类型、企业投资行为与企业绩效三者之间的相互关系进行了实证研究。研究发现,企业家控制较资本家控制在当前经理人市场尚未完善的环境下更为有效,同时揭示了控制类型通过企业投资行为中介作用于企业绩效的机理。此外,由控制类型差异引发的非效率投资显著阻碍了企业绩效的提升,并且投资不足比过度投资对企业绩效的提升阻碍作用更强。
According to the actual control of the company to gain control of the different ways, referring to the reality of the separation of the two companies the actual difference, the type of enterprise control can be divided into entrepreneurial control and capitalist control types. Literature studies show that the type of control and business performance is not simply related, which may include a number of intermediary mediators. Therefore, based on entrepreneur theory and principal-agent theory, this dissertation selects the panel data of 177 family-owned companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares from 2010 to 2014 as the sample, and makes a comparison between the types of control, the investment behavior of enterprises And business performance of the inter-relationship between the three empirical studies. The research finds that entrepreneur control is more effective than capitalist control under the current imperfect market of managers, and at the same time reveals the mechanism that control type acts on firm performance through intermediary of enterprise investment behavior. In addition, inefficient investment triggered by differences in control types significantly impedes the improvement of corporate performance, and underinvestment hinders the promotion of corporate performance more than overinvestment.