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利用微分对策理论研究了海洋产业和陆域产业在产业耦合过程中的合作问题,将其合作过程抽象概括为“耦合产业链声誉”的构建过程,并构建了一个海陆产业微分对策动态模型,运用汉密尔顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程求出海洋产业和陆域产业在Nash非合作博弈、Stackeelberg主从博弈及协同合作博弈条件下的最优策略,并对此三种博弈结构下的反馈均衡结果进行了比较.研究结果显示,协同合作博弈情形下的系统收益、参与双方的收益水平要优于Nash非合作、Stackelberg博弈情形下的收益水平;在Stackelberg博弈情形下,海洋产业的激励因子是海陆耦合产业系统中的一种协调和激励机制,可以提高海陆产业各自以及整个海陆耦合产业系统的收益.
Using the theory of differential game, the cooperation between marine industry and land-based industry in the process of industrial coupling is studied. The process of cooperation is abstractly summarized as the construction process of “the reputation of the coupled industrial chain”, and a dynamic model of differential strategy of land-sea industry , The optimal strategy under the condition of Nash non-cooperation game, Stackeelberg game and cooperative game under the condition of marine industry and land industry is obtained by Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. The feedback equilibrium under the three game structures The results show that under the cooperative game situation, the return of system and the return of participating parties are better than that of Nash non-cooperation and Stackelberg game. In the case of Stackelberg game, the incentive factor of the marine industry is A coordination and incentive mechanism in the land-sea coupling industrial system can increase the returns of the land-sea industry and the entire land-sea-coupled industrial system.