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用“成本-收益”来分析公务员腐败行为的基本思路是,当公务员从事腐败或犯罪活动的收益比其成本或风险大得多时,他就具有从事腐败的动机和激励。当潜在的收益足够大时,他就可能“铤而走险”,这是产生腐败的微观机制。公务员廉洁的收益比其成本或风险大得多时,他就具有廉洁的动机和激励;廉洁潜在的收益足够大时,他就可能“廉浩一生”,这是激励廉洁的微观机制。
The basic idea of using “cost-benefit” to analyze civil servants’ corrupt behavior is that when a civil servant engages in corrupt or criminal activities to gain much more than its cost or risk, he has the motivation and incentive to engage in corruption. When the potential gains are large enough, he may “take the risk” and this is the micro-mechanism of corruption. When civil servants earn more than their costs or risks, they have a clean motive and encouragement; when the potential benefits of integrity are large enough, they may be able to “live a life of noblemanship,” a micro-mechanism that encourages honesty and cleanliness.