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本文对统一价格下可分离物品的拍卖问题进行了研究。首先,在买者报价连续、买者和卖者风险中立、卖者采取可变供给量(将供给量看成价格的函数)的策略下,设计了一个新的基于可变供给量的可分离物品统一价格拍卖机制,研究了其信息激励性和分配的有效性,给出了卖者的最佳供给策略和买者的均衡报价策略。然后,将拍卖机制推广到风险中立、风险爱好和风险厌恶三类风险买者共存的情形,并给出了相应的均衡结论,该结论与现有的一些成果相比更具一般性。最后,给出了拍卖机制在环境规划中应用。具体地,结合“十一五”期间获得的“1+8武汉城市圈”环境规划中有关污染物允许排放总量分配数据和统计申报资料,利用拍卖模型来分析和评价了免费分配方案的有效性程度,并据此给出了关于目前排污申报制度和免费分配方法的若干结论和建议。
This article studies the auction of separable items under a uniform price. Firstly, under the strategy of continuous bidding by buyers, risk neutrality of buyers and sellers and sellers taking variable supply (considering supply as a function of price), a new separable The uniform price auction mechanism of goods, the validity of information incentive and distribution is studied, and the best seller’s optimal supply strategy and the buyer’s balanced bidding strategy are given. Then, this paper generalizes the auction mechanism to coexistence of risk-neutral buyer, risk-loving buyer and risk averse buyer, and gives the corresponding equilibrium conclusion. This conclusion is more general than some existing ones. Finally, the application of auction mechanism in environmental planning is given. Specifically, the auctioned model is used to analyze and evaluate the free distribution of pollutant allowable emissions and statistical reporting data in the “1 + 8 Wuhan City Circle” environmental planning obtained during the 11th Five-Year Plan period The degree of effectiveness of the distribution plan and accordingly gives some conclusions and recommendations on the current system and free distribution of sewage reporting methods.