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Canetti-Krawczyk(CK)模型是分析密钥交换协议的一种形式化方法, 如果一个密钥交换协议用该模型证明是安全的, 则CK模型能够确保该协议具备许多安全属性. 但是我们发现在基于身份的密码系统下该模型不具有确保密钥生成中心(KGC)前向保密性的能力, 而对基于身份的密钥协商协议来说KGC前向保密性是一个重要的安全属性. 通过分析研究发现引起该缺陷的主要原因是CK模型没有充分考虑在基于身份的密码系统下攻击者的能力, 所以在该系统下通过对CK模型增添一个新的攻击能力: 攻陷KGC, 来对该模型进行了相应的扩展, 通过扩展该模型具有确保KGC前向保密性的能力.
The Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) model is a formalized method of analyzing the key exchange protocol, and if a key exchange protocol proves to be secure with this model, the CK model ensures that the protocol has many security attributes, but we find that This model does not have the ability of ensuring the KGC forward secrecy under the identity-based cryptosystem, and KGC forward secrecy is an important security attribute for the identity-based key agreement protocol. It is found that the main cause of this defect is that the CK model does not fully consider the capability of the attacker in the identity-based cryptosystem. Therefore, this model is carried out by adding a new attack capability to the CK model in this system: attacking KGC The corresponding extension, by extending the model has the KGC to ensure the confidentiality of the forward.