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本文以2008—2011年我国沪深两市A股上市公司作为样本,结合企业生命周期理论,实证检验并论证了股权结构与大股东控制权私利之间的关系,描述了其掏空行为的演进过程;并以股权结构作为调节变量,分析控制权私利与企业绩效之间的关系。实证结果表明:(1)随着企业的发展,股权集中度与控制权私利呈倒U型关系;股权制衡在一定程度上能够抑制大股东“掏空”行为。(2)股权集中度与企业绩效呈正U型关系;第二至第五大股东股权制衡度与企业绩效负相关,第二至第十大股东股权制衡度与企业绩效正相关。(3)随着企业的发展,在股权结构的调节作用下,控制权私利与企业绩效之间呈现正U型关系,且控制权私利对企业绩效的影响存在一定的“滞后性”。
Based on the sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets during 2008-2011, the paper empirically tests and verifies the relationship between shareholding structure and the private interests of controlling shareholders, and describes the evolvement of its tunneling behavior Process; and using the ownership structure as a regulatory variable to analyze the relationship between self-interest of control and corporate performance. The empirical results show that: (1) With the development of enterprises, the concentration of ownership and the self-interest of control are inverted U-shaped; and the equity checks and balances can restrain the “hollowing out” of large shareholders to a certain extent. (2) There is a positive U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and corporate performance. The balance of equity between the second largest shareholder and the fifth largest shareholder is negatively correlated with corporate performance. The balance between the equity of the second largest shareholder and the tenth largest shareholder is positively correlated with corporate performance. (3) With the development of enterprises, there is a positive U-shaped relationship between the self-interest of control and corporate performance under the regulatory role of ownership structure, and there is a certain degree of “lag” in the impact of private ownership of control on business performance.