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对于中国古代的司法裁判,学界往往坚持以律令制度为中心,对于古代法官频频援引情理、习惯、儒家经义或律学注释学说为裁判依据,视之为古代罪刑擅断或司法任意的体现,或者陷入中国古代司法中游离于成文规则之外的裁判依据是否为“法”的理论争论中无法自拔。本文立足于传统司法实践,借助于现代非正式法律渊源的概念体系来分析那些脱离国家明定的成文法范畴的裁判依据,如情理、习惯、成案及儒家经义和律学注释学说的性质及其实际运行的状况,以及它们在中国古代法官的裁判依据选择中的地位以及与成文规则的关系,试图在一定程度上展现中国古代法律生活的实际面目。
For the ancient Chinese judicial decisions, academics often adhere to the legal system as the center, for the ancient judge frequently cited the feelings, habits, Confucianism or the theory of legal comment doctrine as the basis for refereeing, regarded as the ancient crime or punishment arbitrarily or judicial embodiment, Or fall into the ancient Chinese judiciary from the written rules outside the referee based on whether the “law” theory argument can not extricate themselves. Based on the traditional judicial practice, this article uses the conceptual system of the origin of modern informal law to analyze the referee bases that depart from the state’s definite statutory scope, such as the nature of the Confucian literati and the annotated doctrine of law and its reality The status of their operation and their position in the judgment of ancient Chinese judges on the basis of their choice as well as the relationship with written rules in an attempt to show the actual appearance of ancient Chinese legal life to a certain extent.