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文章详细论述了基金信息适度披露制度的经济学原理,利用动力机制和契约供给作为基础工具,借助比较信息披露方面的私人边际成本和社会边际成本私人边际收益和社会边际收益的差异规律,分析了基金投资者和基金管理层在信息披露方面强制性和适度性的博弈行为。作者得出结论,只有同时坚持信息披露的强制性和适度性才是可行和现实的,管理层愿意披露的最优水平将永远小于社会最优的披露水平。
The article discusses in detail the economic principle of the moderate disclosure of fund information, using the dynamic mechanism and contractual supply as the basic tools. By comparing the private marginal cost of information disclosure and the marginal cost of society, the marginal revenue of private individuals and the marginal revenue of society are analyzed. Fund investors and fund managers in the disclosure of information mandatory and appropriate behavior of the game. The authors conclude that it is only feasible and realistic to insist the mandatory and appropriate disclosure of information at the same time that the optimal level of management willingness to disclose will always be less than the optimal social disclosure level.