论文部分内容阅读
单一具有市场支配力的企业所采取的忠诚折扣或返利,既是市场中常见的定价策略,也是竞争法中关注的焦点问题之一。Intel在1999—2009年期间,被指控针对六家下游公司(包括两家中国公司),采用忠诚返利销售政策,以限制AMD的竞争,并分别遭到了日本、韩国、欧盟和美国的不同执法。本文基于比较法视角,在对本案事实进行梳理的基础上,对这一问题的理论框架,以及不同法城的司法裁量进行了考察和分析,力求解释同一案件事实在不同分析框架下得到不同结果的原因,并对中国法上缺乏司法调整的现状,以及已有实践所表现出来的执法风格及其制度原因进行了探讨。
Loyalty rebates or rebates taken by a single market-dominant firm are both common pricing strategies in the marketplace and one of the major concerns in competition law. During 1999-2009, Intel was accused of using loyal rebate sales policies against six downstream companies, including two Chinese companies, to limit AMD’s competition and to face different enforcement actions by Japan, South Korea, the European Union and the United States. Based on the facts of this case, based on the comparative law, this paper examines and analyzes the theoretical framework of this issue and the judicial discretion of different Fa-cities, and tries to explain the fact that the same case has different results under different analytical frameworks This article also discusses the current situation of lack of judicial adjustment in Chinese law and the reasons for the law enforcement style and its system manifested in the existing practice.