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用委托代理理论讨论我国政府投资项目中的政府与企业关系,分析政府作为委托人的特点和效用函数形式,构建并求解双重效用模型。双重效用模型中的政府效用包括经济效用和社会效用两个方面。分析表明,双重效用模型中政府效用随着外部的不确定性、社会效用相对权重等参数的改变而改变,进而最优激励策略也随之改变;并且,该模型中政府对企业的激励系数较大,政府最终的效用也较高。
The theory of principal-agent is used to discuss the relationship between government and enterprises in China’s government investment projects. The government’s role as principal and the utility function are analyzed to build and solve the dual utility model. The utility of government in the dual utility model includes both economic utility and social utility. The analysis shows that the utility function of the double utility model changes with the change of parameters such as the external uncertainty and the relative weight of social utility, so that the optimal incentive strategy also changes. Moreover, the incentive coefficient of the government to the firm Large, the final utility of the government is also higher.