论文部分内容阅读
从20世纪90年代后期开始,通过将上市公司的大宗股权转让(block share transfer)给国有的或私有的商业实体,政府放弃了对上市公司的控制。通过考察政府在将公司控制权转让给国有企业或私有实体时所考虑的排序名单,我们发现了某些政府不愿意私有化的迹象,即财政实力较弱的政府将绩效较差的上市公司的控制权转让给私有实体。在将大宗股权转让给私有实体的过程中,地方政府官员对本地收购者也表现出较强的偏好。此外,以收购私人企业为目标的公司(privately-acquired target firms),其收购后的绩效状况通常不如国有收购公司(state-aequired firms)。我们的分析表明,收购前较差的公司绩效、收购后更为严重的隧道行为(tunneling behavior)和更低的投资效率也许能够说明以收购私人企业为目标的公司绩效不佳的原因。我们的研究指出,对于中国这样一个处在各种不同的制度约束下的转型中的和发展中的国家而言,私有化在短期内可能并不会提高效率。
Since the late 1990s, the government has relinquished control of listed companies by transferring block shares of listed companies to state-owned or private commercial entities. By examining the sorting list that the government considered when transferring control of the company to a state-owned company or a private entity, we found some signs that the government is not willing to privatize, that is, the government with weaker financial strength will have poor performance of listed companies. Transfer of control to private entities. In the process of transferring large shares of equity to private entities, local government officials also showed strong preference for local buyers. In addition, privately-acquired target firms, which are acquired for private companies, often have worse post-acquisition performance than state-aequired firms. Our analysis shows that poor company performance before acquisition, more severe tunneling behavior after acquisition, and lower investment efficiency may explain the poor performance of companies that target private companies. Our research indicates that for a transitional and developing country such as China under a variety of different institutional constraints, privatization may not improve efficiency in the short term.