随着中国市场经济的发展以及国企改革的不断深入,非控股国有股权在中国上市公司中变得越来越普遍。该文作者发现,当国有股权处于非控股状态时,公司过度投资的症状变得更加严重。进一步的分析表明:当国有股权处于非控股地位时,一方面国有股权带给公司的政治关系使得公司比不存在国有股权的公司更有能力获得投资资源,另一方面管理层受到的监督与约束少于国有控股的公司,因此过度投资的症状更加严重,公司的业绩也相应较低。以上发现表明,非控股国有股权具有其独特的代理问题,这对于改善经济效率和国有资产管理都有一定的启示。 With the development of China’s market economy and the continuous deepening of SOE reform, non-controlling state-owned shares have become more and more common in Chinese listed companies. The authors found that the symptoms of over-investment in companies became even worse when state-owned equities were non-controlling. Further analysis shows that when the state-owned equity is in a non-controlling position, on the one hand, the political relations brought by the state-owned equity bring the company more power to obtain investment resources than the non-state-owned companies, on the other hand, the management is subject to supervision and restriction Less than the state-controlled companies, so the symptoms of over-investment more serious, the company’s performance is also lower accordingly. The above findings show that the non-controlling state-owned equity has its unique agency problem, which has some enlightenment on improving economic efficiency and state-owned assets management.