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本文通过构建分段的双边市场理论模型,利用二阶段动态博弈,分类论证电子商务平台是否拥有用户信息的4种情况,以此分析用户偏好信息质量的高低对电子商务平台的市场份额、定价策略和利润水平的影响效应。研究表明:在对称性电子商务平台环境下,完全无信息时平台实行统一定价,不完全信息下实行三级价格歧视,且随信息质量的变化,平台利润呈现U型特征。在满足一定条件下,两平台都选择获取用户信息作为唯一的纳什均衡。
In this paper, by building a theoretical model of two-sided market segments and using two-stage dynamic game to classify and verify whether the e-commerce platform owns user information, we analyze the quality of user preference information on the market share of e-commerce platform, pricing strategy And the impact of profit levels. The research shows that under the environment of symmetric e-commerce platform, the platform has a uniform pricing without information and three levels of price discrimination under incomplete information. With the change of information quality, the platform profit presents U-shaped features. Under certain conditions, both platforms choose to obtain user information as the only Nash equilibrium.