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本文认为资本结构优化是产权主体权力和利益的再分配。从理论上分析,每一个企业、每一个与企业相关的利益主体心里都存在着一个最优资本结构。我国国有企业资本结构优化的动因是代理人“寻租”,国有企业内部权力与约束不对称及国有企业制度改造过程中所存在的一些缺陷是导致代理人“寻租”的深层次原因。针对这一问题,本文提出了培育我国国有企业资本结构优化动因的制度安排。
This article believes that the optimization of the capital structure is the redistribution of rights and interests of the property rights subject. From the theoretical analysis, there is an optimal capital structure in every enterprise and every enterprise-related interest body. The motivation of the optimization of the capital structure of state-owned enterprises in our country is the “rent-seeking” of agents. The asymmetry in the internal power and constraints of state-owned enterprises and the defects in the process of the transformation of state-owned enterprises are the deep-seated reasons that cause agents to “seek rent”. To address this issue, this paper proposes institutional arrangements for cultivating the incentives for the optimization of the capital structure of state-owned enterprises in China.