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功耗攻击是近年来嵌入式加密芯片安全的重要威胁之一,它以较低的代价和很快的速度破解未加防护的加密芯片.简化固定值掩码由于所需消耗资源少,特别适合低功耗小面积要求的智能卡,本文对简化固定值掩码的二种实现方法中一种进行了深入研究与分析,通过理论和实验证明简化固定值掩码采用相同字节方法并不能抗二阶功耗攻击.提出一种改进的部分随机固定值掩码算法,理论和实验证明可以抗二阶差分功耗攻击,与上述简化固定值掩码算法相比:本算法在保持简化固定值掩码算法优点的基础上,可以抗二阶差分功耗攻击.
Power attack is one of the most important threats to the security of embedded cryptographic chips in recent years, and it can crack unprotected cryptographic chips at lower cost and faster speed. The simplified fixed-value mask is especially suitable for less resource consumption In this paper, one of the two methods to simplify the fixed-value mask is deeply studied and analyzed. It is proved theoretically and experimentally that the simplified fixed-value mask adopts the same byte method and can not resist the second Order power consumption attack.An improved partial random fixed-value mask algorithm is proposed, which is proved by theory and experiment that it can resist second-order differential power attacks. Compared with the simplified fixed-value mask algorithm, Based on the advantages of the code algorithm, it can resist second-order differential power attacks.