当前国有商业银行面临的一个突出问题是信贷激励———约束机制不对称问题 ,直接体现为约束过度和激励不足 ,极大地影响了国有商业银行的效率和盈利能力。本文以委托———代理理论对此进行了理论分析 ,并辅以安徽安庆的个案实证 ,在技术上提出了激励、约束和考核评价的可操作建设 At present, one outstanding problem facing state-owned commercial banks is that the asymmetry of credit incentive-restraint mechanism is directly reflected as over-constrained and under-incentive, which greatly affects the efficiency and profitability of state-owned commercial banks. This thesis makes a theoretical analysis on the theory of principal-agent theory, supplemented by the case of Anqing in Anhui province and proposes the operable construction of incentive, restriction and appraisal