论文部分内容阅读
本文尝试进一步探讨制度的生成机制,并选择富有特色的惠安女“长住娘家”婚俗进行研究。通过生态增长演化模型论述两性劳动分工的生成,而这种分工格局决定了参与者之间的博弈规则,在此博弈规则下,女性家庭生产的边际收益比男性大,对女方家庭来说,居住在娘家具有很高的效益并存在最优的居住时间值。但是,这并不必然会出现“长住娘家”的婚俗,而是存在多重均衡,文中进一步运用演化博弈论中的学习模型来探讨多重均衡的选择问题,从而解释制度的生成问题。
This paper attempts to further explore the mechanism of the system, and select the characteristics of Hui’an women “long stay home ” wedding custom research. Through the evolutionary model of ecological growth, the generation of the division of labor between men and women is discussed, and this division of labor determines the rules of the game among the participants. Under the rules of the game, the marginal benefit of female family production is greater than that of men. For the female family, In the Niangjia has a very high efficiency and the existence of the optimal value of the time of residence. However, this is not necessarily the marriage custom of “Long Stayed Mother”, but there are multiple equilibria. In this article, we further use the learning model of evolutionary game theory to discuss the choice of multiple equilibria, and then explain the formation of the system.