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我国上市公司管理层对自身效用最大化的追求,形成我国上市公司会计行为异化的直接动因,而综合性激励报酬机制的缺位为管理层操控会计行为提供了充足的理性自我辩解,委托-代理链条的延长所、监管人事实上的缺位,无疑为管理层操控会计行为提供了足够的机会。内生性会计行为异化由此泛滥。完善管理人报酬合约,建立相应的公司治理的内外制度安排,成为转轨时期规范我国上市公司会计行为的必然选择。
The pursuit of the maximization of the effectiveness of the management of listed companies in our country leads to the direct motivation for the alienation of accounting behavior of listed companies in our country. However, the absence of comprehensive incentive compensation mechanism provides sufficient rational self-justification for management to control accounting practices. The extension of the chain, the fact that the absence of regulators, will undoubtedly provide ample opportunity for management to control accounting practices. Endogenous accounting behavior alienation thus flooded. Improving the remuneration contracts of managers and establishing the corresponding internal and external institutional arrangements for corporate governance have become the inevitable choice for standardizing the accounting behavior of Chinese listed companies in the transitional period.