国有企业做为国民经济发展的支柱,对发展社会生产力,巩固社会质疑公有制地位起着举足轻重的作用。近些年来,国有企业经理人贪污腐败、在职消费连年递增想象日趋严重,不仅增加了企业的经营风险,导致资源配置效率低下,更加重了国家财政负担。本文从动机和根源两个的角度分析了道德风险产生的原因,委托人与代理人之间的信息不对称问题是道德风险产生的重要条件,但有道德风险的动机并不一定会成为现实的道德风险,其根源是国家政策性负担,在此基础上,提出建立合理的激励制度、限制企业经理人的自主经营权等相关策略来减少中小国有企业经理人的道德风险问题。 As the pillar of national economic development, state-owned enterprises play an important role in developing social productive forces and in consolidating the social challenge of public ownership. In recent years, the managers of state-owned enterprises are embezzling corruption and their occupational consumption is increasing day by day. The imagination is becoming more and more serious. This not only increases the operating risks of enterprises, but also leads to the inefficient allocation of resources and the heavier national financial burden. This paper analyzes the causes of moral hazard from the perspective of motivation and root cause. The problem of asymmetric information between principal and agent is an important condition for moral hazard, but the motivation of moral hazard may not necessarily become a reality Moral hazard, the root cause of which is the national policy burden, on this basis, puts forward some strategies to reduce the moral hazard of managers in small and medium sized state-owned enterprises by setting up a reasonable incentive system and limiting the autonomy of managers.