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本文探讨新上市公司是否由于会计性信息不对称越严重,其新股折价幅度较大。同时探讨会计性信息不对称越严重时,上市后高管持股比例是否会增加。结果发现,会计性信息不对称越严重的新上市公司,其新股折价幅度较大。以上市后一年为计算期间,则会计性信息不对称越大时,新股长期性折价幅度也越大,但不显著。一般性信息不对称越严重时,新股上市折价幅度也较大。会计性信息不对称越严重的公司,其管理层可能隐瞒了不好信息,上市后高管持股比例并没有显著的增加,反而降低了。这说明,会计性信息不对称是公司上市时形成新股折价幅度与管理层内部交易的原因之一。
This article explores whether the newly listed companies suffer a greater degree of discounts due to the asymmetric accounting information. At the same time to explore the more serious accounting information asymmetry, after the listing of executives will increase the proportion of shares. The results show that the more serious the asymmetric accounting information, the new listed companies, the discount of their new shares a larger margin. To calculate the period after the listing year, the larger the asymmetric accounting information, the greater the long-term discount of new shares, but not significant. As the general information asymmetry is more serious, the IPO discount is also larger. The more serious accounting information asymmetry of the company, its management may hide the bad information, after the listing of executives did not increase the proportion of holdings, but decreased. This shows that accounting information asymmetry is one of the reasons for the formation of the IPO discount and the management of internal transactions.