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在正常产品市场上,引入产品异质性、研发溢出、企业吸收能力等影响企业创新的关键参数,利用非合作博弈中常用的逆推归纳法,考察研发结局确定下成本降低性工艺创新企业的讨价还价能力对许可机制的选择以及许可得益大小的影响;在此模型设定条件下,以在位创新企业为视角,将两部制许可与固定费许可、产量提成许可进行比较。研究结论表明,在位创新企业的得益在固定费许可下随着其讨价还价能力的增强而增大,而在产量提成许可和两部制许可机制下,其得益不受讨价还价能力的影响,但其讨价还价能力却有助于许可机制的选择;无论实际创新程度和产品异质性如何,最优的许可机制始终是两部制许可,且与不许可相比,进行两部制许可总是最优的;在位创新企业对创新程度的高估、监督成本的过大和不完全的讨价还价能力可能是现实中其他许可机制并存的原因。
In the normal product market, we introduce the key parameters that affect the innovation of enterprises, such as product heterogeneity, R & D spillover, and enterprise absorptive capacity. We use the inverse regression inductive method commonly used in non-cooperative game to examine the R & D results to determine the cost-reducing technology innovation enterprises Bargaining ability of the licensing mechanism and the impact of the size of the allowable benefits; under the condition of this model, the two-part license is compared with the fixed-fee license and the production license. The conclusion of the study shows that the profits of in-position innovative enterprises increase with the increase of their bargaining power under the license of fixed fee, and their profitability is not affected by the bargaining power under the production license and the two-part licensing system. But its bargaining power contributes to the choice of licensing mechanism. Regardless of the degree of actual innovation and product heterogeneity, the optimal licensing mechanism is always a two-part license and compared to the non-permitted one, the two-part license is always Optimal; Ongoing innovations overestimated the degree of innovation, oversight costs and incomplete bargaining ability may be the reason for the coexistence of other licensing mechanisms in reality.