冷战时期曾一度影响西德对外关系、特别是与东欧邻国关系的“哈尔斯坦主义”(1955-1970年)一直尚未得到系统的研究。它在战后重建欧洲和平与安全中到底起到了哪些作用?波恩政府坚持这一原则时,阿登纳及其幕僚是否考虑到他们有限的能力与影响?实际上,由于在外交实践中陷入困境,“哈尔斯坦主义”到1963年就开始失去意义。将“哈尔斯坦主义”置于整个西德外交的视角下进行考察,可以发现,“哈尔斯坦主义”不仅未能实现西德外交的预期目标,而且也反映出德国人在外交理念上的传统风格,即在对现实政治目标的追求中带有焦躁与鲁莽的心态。 The “Hal-Stanism” (1955-70), once influential in West Germany’s foreign relations during the Cold War era, especially its relations with its neighbors in Eastern Europe, has not been systematically studied. What role does it play in the post-war reconstruction of peace and security in Europe? In keeping with this principle, when the Bonn Government upholds this principle, does Adenauer and his aides consider their limited capabilities and influence? In fact, due to difficulties in diplomatic practice “Hal-Stanism” began to lose its meaning by 1963. Examining “Hallsteinianism ” from the perspective of diplomacy of the entire West Germany shows that “Hal-Stanism ” not only fails to meet the expected goal of West Germany diplomacy, but also reflects that the Germans are The traditional style of diplomatic ideology, that is, the pursuit of realistic political goals with an impatient and reckless mentality.