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CEO信息分享与独立董事决策参与和监督角色的发挥存在联动效应,即独立董事决策参与角色的有效发挥能够促进CEO的信息分享,而信息分享增加所带来的独立董事监督力度的提升又会抑制CEO的信息披露动机。本文基于投资项目选择视角,结合我国制度背景建立动态博弈模型,以探究CEO信息分享与独立董事角色发挥的联动效应。研究表明,CEO信息分享能够提升独立董事的决策参与质量和监督力度;独立董事比例越高、股权集中度越低,CEO信息分享对独立董事监督力度的提升越大;CEO信息分享决策取决于其对独立董事决策参与质量和监督力度的权衡,与股权集中度、独立董事声誉激励正相关,与独立董事比例、控制权私利负相关。
There is a linkage effect between CEO information sharing and independent director’s participation in decision-making and supervising the role of oversight, that is, effective participation of independent directors in decision-making participation can promote CEO’s information sharing, and the increase in independent directors’ supervision resulting from increased information sharing will inhibit CEO’s information disclosure motivation. This article builds a dynamic game model based on the investment project selection perspective combined with the institutional background of our country to explore the linkage effect of CEO information sharing and the role of independent directors. The research shows that CEO information sharing can improve the independent director’s decision-making participation quality and supervision; the higher the proportion of independent directors and the lower the degree of ownership concentration, the greater the increase of CEO information sharing over the supervision of independent directors; CEO information sharing decision depends on its The balance of decision-making participation quality and supervision of independent directors is positively related to equity concentration, independent directors’ reputational incentives, and negatively related to the proportion of independent directors and private interests of control rights.