论文部分内容阅读
基于上市公司2005年至2010年的历史数据,本文首次利用银行贷款公告反应来检验不同的货币政策如何影响银行信贷对企业的监督作用。我们的主要发现有:第一,相对于银根宽松阶段,银根紧缩时贷款公告的异常收益率为负且显著更低,表明在银根紧缩时银行的信贷决策并非主要服从于经济目标,导致银行通过信贷发挥的监督作用更差;第二,相对于非国有企业,国有企业在银根紧缩时贷款公告的异常收益率为负且显著更低,意味着在银根紧缩时银行信贷资源会倾向于国有企业,以至于对国有企业的监督作用更弱。
Based on the historical data of listed companies from 2005 to 2010, this paper first uses the bank loan announcement response to test how different monetary policies affect the supervision of bank credit on enterprises. Our main findings are as follows: First, compared with the loose monetary easing, the abnormal yield of loan announcements when monetary tightening is negative and significantly lower indicates that banks’ credit decisions are not mainly subject to economic goals during the monetary tightening and lead banks to pass Second, compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the unusual rate of return on loans announced by state-owned enterprises during the monetary shortening is negative and significantly lower, which means that bank credit resources tend to be lean towards state-owned enterprises , So that the supervision of state-owned enterprises is weaker.