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在同时面临随机产出(random yield)和随机需求的供应链中,引入基于现实应用设计的具有声誉效用机制和信任机制的承诺契约,同时考虑紧急采购,建立多重不确定关系型供应链决策模型。分析该类型集中式供应链(CSC:centralized supply chain)和以Stackelberg博弈为基础的分散式供应链(DSC:decentralized supply chain)的最优供应、采购策略存在性及其条件,应用逆向推导法探讨供需双方的博弈过程;通过绝对和相对指标分析供应链及其成员的绩效;结合理论推导和数值试验对承诺契约参数、供应链及其成员最优策略和期望收益做关于供需不确定性、紧急采购价格的敏感性分析。
In the supply chain which is also faced with random yield and stochastic demand, a commitment contract based on realistic application design with reputation utility mechanism and trust mechanism is introduced. At the same time, emergency procurement is taken into account to establish multiple uncertain supply chain decision models . This paper analyzes the optimal supply of this type of centralized supply chain (CSC) and the decentralized supply chain (DSC) based on the Stackelberg game, the existence of the procurement strategy and its conditions, and the application of reverse derivation The game process of supply and demand sides; the performance of supply chain and its members through absolute and relative indicators; the theory of deduction and numerical experiments on the contractual parameters of commitment, supply chain and its members optimal strategy and expected return on supply and demand uncertainty, emergency Sensitivity analysis of purchase price.