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基于风险导向审计理论,以2007-2014年的A股上市公司为样本,检验了审计师对CEO变更的风险认知以及社会信任对两者关系的调节作用。研究发现:审计师能够识别CEO变更时的公司风险,显著提高审计费用,且这一影响主要体现在外部人员继任CEO的公司中;作为非正式制度,社会信任能够弱化CEO变更对审计费用的正效应。进一步的研究显示,CEO变更会降低盈余质量,导致非标意见报告增加,但这一效应在国际“四大”事务所审计的公司中并未显现。
Based on the risk-based audit theory, taking the 2007-2014 A-share listed companies as a sample, this paper examines the auditor’s regulatory role of the risk perception of CEO change and the social trust on the relationship between the two. The study found that auditors can identify the corporate risk of CEO changes and significantly increase the audit fees, which is mainly reflected in the company of external staff successors. As an informal system, social trust can weaken the CEO’s change of audit costs effect. Further research shows that CEO change will reduce the quality of earnings and lead to the increase of non-standard opinion reports, but this effect does not appear in the companies audited by the international “big four” firms.