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When Donald Trump first de- clared his candidacy for U.S. President， he was considered little more than a noisy troublemaker. However， now that he has been sworn in as President of the United States， the world must prepare for changes brought by the Trump administration.
Although Trump didn’t systematically elaborate on his foreign policy ideas， some valuable clues can be found in speeches he made during the campaign. First， Trump strongly advocates the “America first”doctrine， and his foreign policy echoes an old isolationism. Compared with his predecessors since World War II， Trump demonstrates a weaker desire for American global leadership. He opposes excessive U.S. involvement in world affairs and objects to so many overseas burdens， arguing that the U.S. should focus on domestic problems. Second， Trump is a nationalist， economically. He cares about U.S. interests and economic holdings and sees globalization in a negative light， opposing free trade. Trump has seemed just as skeptical about global governance and international cooperation. For example， he has asserted that the Paris Agreement， which deals with climate change， is unnecessary and that some international organizations are unreliable.
Based on these clues， the Trump administration’s foreign policy is expected to veer in a new direction.
First， the U.S. will practice more strategic retrenchment and retreating. The Obama administration （2009-2017） learned a lesson in over-reaching from the Bush administration （2001-2009） and carried out strategic contraction to some extent. For example， Obama ended the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and showed more restraint and prudence in launching overseas military interventions. It now seems that Trump may go even further. Of course， since the U.S. has considerable overseas interests， Trump will find it hard to practice complete isolationism. Instead， he will likely pursue a policy of selective participation and involvement， focusing on safeguarding American traditional interests in Europe， the Middle East， and East Asia， and asking allies to shoulder more security responsibilities.
Second， Trump will put the brakes on globalization and global governance， or even attempt to reverse some aspects of globalization. Trump will pull U.S. participation from both the Trans-Pacific Partnership （TPP） and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership （TTIP）， both of which were aggressively promoted by the Obama administration. Trump may also withdraw from the Paris Agreement， just as the Bush administration abandoned the Kyoto Protocol. Trump has shown apathy towards mechanisms promoting global economic governance and regional trade-and-investment-liberalization such as the Group of Twenty and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Third， Trump could improve the U.S.’s relations with Russia substantially. Based on his fundamental philosophy of strategic contraction， Trump wouldn’t be interested in suppressing Russia through NATO expansion. The Trump administration could pass off the Ukraine crisis to European allies. The U.S. will continue to play a role in crisis management， but perhaps not the lead. The Trump administration will likely gradually reduce and lift sanctions against Russia in exchange for U.S.-Russia cooperation in other areas.
Fourth， the Trump administration won’t be as aggressive with the Asia- Pacific Rebalance Strategy advocated and promoted by the Obama administration. Trump will surely continue to attach great importance to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region， but his methods of maintaining these interests will change. Economically， with less appetite for multilateral arrangements， the U.S. is expected to rely more on bilateral arrangements. Strategically and like his predecessor， Trump will not seek active measures to contain China， and will probably not vigorously promote security cooperation with allies. Instead， he has called for allies， such as Japan and South Korea， to shoulder more security responsibilities on their own.
Economic and trade benefits are Trump’s priority in regards to China policy. Since Trump has highlighted the importance of reviving U.S. manufacturing and creating jobs， he will place greater emphasis on traditional trade and show more inclination toward protectionism， which will likely lead to increased trade frictions between China and the U.S. However， Trump welcomes China to expand its investments in the U.S.， which will boost U.S. manufacturing， increase employment， and upgrade outdated infrastructure. Trump will soften his ideology on foreign policy towards China and avoid fierce geopolitical competition with China in the Western Pacific. Still， the Trump administration will remain highly alert towards China’s development of military power. There will be more practical cooperation between China and the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region. Traditionally， Republicans have been more supportive of Taiwan， and the development of U.S.-Taiwan relations， especially military relations， demands special attention.
Although Trump didn’t systematically elaborate on his foreign policy ideas， some valuable clues can be found in speeches he made during the campaign. First， Trump strongly advocates the “America first”doctrine， and his foreign policy echoes an old isolationism. Compared with his predecessors since World War II， Trump demonstrates a weaker desire for American global leadership. He opposes excessive U.S. involvement in world affairs and objects to so many overseas burdens， arguing that the U.S. should focus on domestic problems. Second， Trump is a nationalist， economically. He cares about U.S. interests and economic holdings and sees globalization in a negative light， opposing free trade. Trump has seemed just as skeptical about global governance and international cooperation. For example， he has asserted that the Paris Agreement， which deals with climate change， is unnecessary and that some international organizations are unreliable.
Based on these clues， the Trump administration’s foreign policy is expected to veer in a new direction.
First， the U.S. will practice more strategic retrenchment and retreating. The Obama administration （2009-2017） learned a lesson in over-reaching from the Bush administration （2001-2009） and carried out strategic contraction to some extent. For example， Obama ended the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and showed more restraint and prudence in launching overseas military interventions. It now seems that Trump may go even further. Of course， since the U.S. has considerable overseas interests， Trump will find it hard to practice complete isolationism. Instead， he will likely pursue a policy of selective participation and involvement， focusing on safeguarding American traditional interests in Europe， the Middle East， and East Asia， and asking allies to shoulder more security responsibilities.
Second， Trump will put the brakes on globalization and global governance， or even attempt to reverse some aspects of globalization. Trump will pull U.S. participation from both the Trans-Pacific Partnership （TPP） and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership （TTIP）， both of which were aggressively promoted by the Obama administration. Trump may also withdraw from the Paris Agreement， just as the Bush administration abandoned the Kyoto Protocol. Trump has shown apathy towards mechanisms promoting global economic governance and regional trade-and-investment-liberalization such as the Group of Twenty and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Third， Trump could improve the U.S.’s relations with Russia substantially. Based on his fundamental philosophy of strategic contraction， Trump wouldn’t be interested in suppressing Russia through NATO expansion. The Trump administration could pass off the Ukraine crisis to European allies. The U.S. will continue to play a role in crisis management， but perhaps not the lead. The Trump administration will likely gradually reduce and lift sanctions against Russia in exchange for U.S.-Russia cooperation in other areas.
Fourth， the Trump administration won’t be as aggressive with the Asia- Pacific Rebalance Strategy advocated and promoted by the Obama administration. Trump will surely continue to attach great importance to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region， but his methods of maintaining these interests will change. Economically， with less appetite for multilateral arrangements， the U.S. is expected to rely more on bilateral arrangements. Strategically and like his predecessor， Trump will not seek active measures to contain China， and will probably not vigorously promote security cooperation with allies. Instead， he has called for allies， such as Japan and South Korea， to shoulder more security responsibilities on their own.
Economic and trade benefits are Trump’s priority in regards to China policy. Since Trump has highlighted the importance of reviving U.S. manufacturing and creating jobs， he will place greater emphasis on traditional trade and show more inclination toward protectionism， which will likely lead to increased trade frictions between China and the U.S. However， Trump welcomes China to expand its investments in the U.S.， which will boost U.S. manufacturing， increase employment， and upgrade outdated infrastructure. Trump will soften his ideology on foreign policy towards China and avoid fierce geopolitical competition with China in the Western Pacific. Still， the Trump administration will remain highly alert towards China’s development of military power. There will be more practical cooperation between China and the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region. Traditionally， Republicans have been more supportive of Taiwan， and the development of U.S.-Taiwan relations， especially military relations， demands special attention.