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传统价格型需求响应(DR)可能造成负荷弹性不大的用户用电成本的增加,为此提出了一种基于Stackelberg模型的主动配电网(ADN)动态电价DR方案,确保用户参与DR的收益。将负荷分为代理负荷和非代理负荷两类,通过DR代理调控代理负荷,利用动态博弈理论下的Stackelberg模型分析DR代理与ADN的互动过程,求解Stackelberg均衡得到DR代理与ADN的均衡策略,即动态电价与负荷安排。最后,采用IEEE 6节点的算例证明了所提出的DR设计在限制用户电费支出方面的有效性。
Traditional price demand response (DR) may result in an increase of user electricity cost with little load elasticity. To solve this problem, a Stackelberg-based dynamic pricing model of active distribution network (ADN) is proposed to ensure users’ participation in the DR revenue . The load is divided into two types: agent load and non-agent load. The agent load is regulated by DR agent. The Stackelberg model under dynamic game theory is used to analyze the interaction between DR agent and ADN. The equilibrium strategy of DR agent and ADN is solved by Stackelberg equilibrium. Dynamic electricity price and load arrangement. Finally, an IEEE 6-node example demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed DR design in limiting user electricity bills.