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长期以来,我国公务员培训任务是由官方的培训机构承担的,是一种层级制培训模式。20世纪90年代以来,我国公务员培训出现了市场化,存在着三种市场化培训模式:有限市场化、准市场化、完全市场化。本文运用交易成本理论的“区别性组合”逻辑,在一个培训交易双方博弈的框架内分析了影响培训模式选择的各种因素,并用实地调研的数据检验了这一理论分析。
For a long time, the task of training civil servants in our country is undertaken by the official training institutions, which is a hierarchical training model. Since the 1990s, there has been a marketization of civil servant training in our country. There are three kinds of marketization training modes: limited marketization, quasi-marketization and full marketization. This paper analyzes the various factors that affect the choice of training mode in the framework of the game of both parties by using the theory of transaction cost and “discriminative combination ” logic, and tests the theoretical analysis with field survey data.