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针对传统渠道中处于非主导地位的中小制造企业开展双渠道销售时存在的价格冲突问题,考虑产品数字属性对渠道需求的影响,构建了制造商与零售商独立决策和制造商占非主导地位两种情况下的双渠道定价决策模型,给出了两种情况下的双渠道最优定价,并分别考察了产品数字属性变化以及决策权利结构不同对最优定价的影响。研究结果表明,处于非主导地位的中小制造企业应采用依从强势零售商的定价策略,该策略有利于制造商和零售商以及渠道整体收益的增加;随着产品数字属性的增大,制造商的最优定价相应地提高,而零售商的最优定价则相应地降低;制造商占非主导地位时的双渠道最优定价高于制造商与零售商独立决策时的双渠道最优定价。
In view of the price conflict existing in the small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises that are not dominant in the traditional channels, the influence of the digital attributes of the products on the channel demand is considered, and the independent decision makers and retailers of the manufacturers and retailers occupy two non-dominant positions This paper presents two-channel optimal pricing in two cases, and examines the influence of the change of digital attributes of products and the different rights structure of decision-making on the optimal pricing. The results show that the small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises in the non-dominant position should adopt the pricing strategy of conforming to the strong retailers, which is beneficial to the manufacturers and retailers as well as to the increase of the overall revenue of the channels. As the digital attributes of the products increase, The optimal pricing is correspondingly higher, while the retailer’s optimal pricing is correspondingly lower. The optimal price of dual channels when the manufacturer is not dominant is higher than the optimal price of dual channels when the manufacturer and retailer make independent decisions.