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本文构建了一个出借人单边多归属的双寡头竞争模型,基于中国的P2P平台面板数据,利用似不相关估计方法对影响平台双边用户市场份额的相关参数进行估计,研究结果显示,P2P平台中的出借人实质上享有补贴,原因在于投资人相对于借款人对于平台间的价格差异更为敏感,并且出借人获取的交叉网络效应高于借款人,从而导致借贷双方之间的非对称价格结构;尽管加强透明度建设可以有效吸引投资者,但是透明度建设需要极大增加平台成本,同时考虑到交叉网络效应的存在导致平台在出借人一边存在正的机会成本,现实中,平台宁愿将更多投资投入到线下借款项目的发掘中,以及通过保证收益的方式吸引更多的出借人加入平台;同时,出借人多归属性能有效降低平台的垄断性。
This paper constructs a unilateral and duopoly multi-attribution duopoly competition model. Based on the P2P platform panel data in China, we use the irrelevant estimation method to estimate the relevant parameters that affect the market share of bilateral users in the platform. The results show that in the P2P platform Of the lenders enjoy substantial subsidies because investors are more sensitive to the price differences between platforms than lenders and the lender obtains a higher cross-network effect than the borrower, resulting in an asymmetric price structure between lenders and borrowers ; Although the construction of transparency can effectively attract investors, the construction of transparency needs to greatly increase the platform cost, and in view of the existence of cross-network effect, the platform has positive opportunity cost on the lender side. In reality, the platform would rather invest more Investing in the exploration of off-line loan projects and attracting more lenders to the platform by way of guaranteed returns; meanwhile, the lender’s attribution performance effectively reduces the monopoly of the platform.