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本文采用我国上市家族企业的大样本数据,实证检验家族企业中高管选择对资本投资决策的影响。研究发现,由于外部职业经理人与家族股东利益不一致,投资期限相对较短,所以当企业选择外部职业经理人担任高管时,资本投资规模会显著减少。独立董事和制度环境的内外部监督机制可以对经理人的短视投资行为有一定的约束作用。同时,进一步研究发现,外部职业经理人投资效率也相对较低,监督机制对与低效率投资行为的约束作用不够显著。
This article uses the large sample data of the listed family-owned enterprises in our country to test the influence of senior executives in the family-owned enterprises on the capital investment decision-making. The study finds that due to the inconsistent interests of outside professional managers and family shareholders and the relatively short investment period, the scale of capital investment will be significantly reduced when the enterprises choose the external professional managers as executives. Independent directors and the internal and external supervision system of the institutional environment can have some restraint on the manager’s short-term investment behavior. At the same time, further research finds that the investment efficiency of external professional managers is relatively low, and the supervisory mechanism has not significant effect on the inefficient investment behavior.