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以2002年~2003年间中国上市公司为研究样本,从控股股东无偿占用上市公司资金的角度,详细考察了金字塔股权结构下控股股东的控制权、现金流量权以及二者的分离程度对其掠夺动机和行为的影响。研究发现,随着控股股东控制权增加而形成的壕沟防御效应加剧了其对中小投资者的利益侵害行为,随着现金流量权增加而形成的利益协同效应削弱了其攫取私利的动机,并且由金字塔股权结构引发的两权分离加剧了控股股东的掏空行为。进一步的研究表明,严厉、高效运转的税收体制提高了内部人掠夺行为的风险和成本,对控股股东的越权和违规行为形成有效的防范和制约。
Taking the listed companies in China from 2002 to 2003 as the research sample, from the perspective of the controlling shareholder’s taking up the funds of the listed company at no-cost, this paper examines in detail the control over the controlling shareholder, the cash flow right and the degree of separation of the two from the control of the pyramid’s ownership structure. And the impact of behavior. The study finds that the moat defensive effect formed by the increase of controlling shareholder’s controlling power exacerbates its infringement on the interests of small and medium-sized investors. The synergetic effect of synergies with the increase of cash flow right weakens their motives for self-interest grabbing. Pyramid ownership structure triggered by the separation of ownership intensified the controlling shareholder’s tunneling behavior. Further research shows that the harsh and efficient operation of the tax system increases the risk and cost of insiders’ predatory behavior and effectively prevents and restricts the overrun and non-compliance of controlling shareholders.