论文部分内容阅读
代理、道德风险和契约设计等问题是当今经济研究的热点之一。创业投资的研究视角已由早期的委托代理理论(即把创业企业家当作代理人并激励其努力)转向双边的道德风险和双边努力激励。本文综述了单边道德风险和双边道德风险的研究进展,剖析了委托人和代理人双方产生道德风险的原因及表现形式,深入研究了双方各自的道德风险产生机理和契约安排,最后指出从相机控制的角度研究契约设计是未来的一个方向。
Agency, moral hazard and contractual design are one of the hot topics in economic research. The research perspective on venture capital has shifted from early agency theory (ie, using entrepreneurial entrepreneurs as agents and motivating their efforts) to bilateral moral hazard and bilateral efforts. This article summarizes the research progress of unilateral moral hazard and bilateral moral hazard, analyzes the reasons and manifestations of the moral hazard both of the principal and the agent, deeply studies both the respective moral hazard generation mechanism and contractual arrangements, and finally points out that from the camera Controlling the contract design is one of the future directions.