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职业生涯关注与在职消费同属企业高管隐性激励体系中的重要部分,两者不仅存在潜在的替代关系,也可能受到企业的委托代理关系和企业所处的市场环境的影响。在激励机制的理论框架下,选取2005年至2013年中国非金融类上市企业作为样本,以企业产权性质和所在省份的政府行为规范化指数等量化指标作为调节性因素,构建多元线性回归模型;按同年度、同行业的在职消费四分位水平进行组别划分,构建分类Logistic回归模型,以验证假设,并从测度方式和替代性情景两个角度实施测试,以保证研究结论稳健成立。研究结果表明,基于职业生涯关注的隐性激励减弱时,上市企业高管会寻求更多的在职消费;在具备国有产权性质和身处政府行为规范化程度较低地区的上市企业中,职业生涯关注激励与在职消费的替代关系更加突出。研究结论对深入认识代理问题、优化激励契约具有重要意义和启示。
Career concerns and in-service consumption belong to the business executives of the implicit incentive system, an important part of both the potential substitution exists not only may also be affected by the enterprise agency relationship and the business environment where the market. Under the theoretical framework of Incentive Mechanism, this paper selects China’s non-financial listed companies from 2005 to 2013 as a sample, and adopts the property right of the enterprise and the quantitative index of the government action standardization index in the province as the regulatory factor to construct the multiple linear regression model. In the same year, the quartiles of on-the-job consumption in the same industry were divided into groups. A classification Logistic regression model was constructed to verify the assumptions and conduct tests from two aspects: measurement and alternative scenarios to ensure the conclusion of the research. The results show that when the recessive incentive based on career concern is weakening, executives of listed companies will seek more on-the-job consumption. Among the listed companies with state-owned property rights and lower standardization of government behavior, Incentive and on-the-job consumption of the more prominent alternative. The conclusion of the study is of great significance and enlightenment for understanding the agency problem and optimizing the incentive contract.