论文部分内容阅读
为探究政治关系背景独董的资源获取效应及其作用边界,本研究以2010-2012年沪深A股上市公司为样本,分析并检验了独立董事政治关联对银行信贷的影响以及企业产权性质和高管政治关联对独董政治关联贷款效应的调节作用。研究结果表明,独董政治关联能够增强企业进行银行信贷的能力;此外,贷款效应会受到国有产权性质和高管政治关联的影响,即国有产权性质对独董政治关联的贷款效应有削弱作用,高管政治关联对独董政治关联的贷款效应有增强作用;国有产权性质会削弱高管政治关联对独董政治关联贷款效应的调节作用。研究结论对完善上市公司独董选聘机制以及信贷资源配置的市场化改革提供了参考借鉴。
In order to explore the resource acquisition effect and its function boundary of independent director on the background of political relations, this study takes the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2012 as a sample to analyze and test the impact of political connections of independent directors on bank credit, Regulatory Effect of Executive Political Connection on Loan Effects of Political Connection with Independent Directors. The research shows that the independence of political parties can enhance the ability of enterprises to carry out bank credit. In addition, the loan effect will be affected by the nature of state-owned property rights and the political connections of senior executives. That is, the nature of state-owned property rights has a weakened effect on the loan effects of the political relations among independent directors, The political connection between senior executives and the independence of political parties to enhance the relationship between the loan effect; the nature of state-owned property rights will weaken the senior executives of political relations on the independence of the political relevance of the loan effect of the regulatory role. The conclusions of the study provide reference for improving the selection mechanism of independent directors of listed companies and the market-oriented reform of credit resources allocation.