保监会与保险公司之间的信息不对称导致保险监管过程中的道德风险问题,使得保险监管力度不够。目前,我国采用的仍是受保护市场的监管模式,主要监管市场准入和费率厘定,对保险公司的偿付能力和资产负债比例管理还未加以严格监管和控制。这种严格的监管模式尽管在初期起到一定的积极作用,但是,由于保监会难以掌握保险公司的完全信息,这种管理方式的缺陷日益突出,比如牺牲了部分市场效率、忽略了非现场财务和偿付能力监管,从而产生了许多问题。 Asymmetric information between CIRC and insurance companies leads to moral hazard in the process of insurance supervision, which makes the insurance supervision insufficient. At present, China still adopts the regulatory mode of the protected market. It mainly regulates market access and rate determination. The solvency of insurance companies and the asset-liability ratio management have not yet been strictly regulated and controlled. Although this strict regulatory model has played a positive role in the initial stage, due to the inability of the CIRC to grasp the complete information of insurance companies, such management flaws have become increasingly prominent, such as sacrificing some market efficiency and ignoring off-site financial and Solvency regulation has created many problems.