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本文应用微分博弈理论分析了双头寡占的厂商开采不可再生资源时的行为。在假设厂商采取开环策略的情况下,得到的主要结论表明:当厂商间的单位开采成本或者资源存量之间的差距达到一定程度时,某些厂商的资源开采路径将会近似于Hubbert’sPeak的形状。另外,本文也分析了从价税和从量税两种税收形式对厂商行为的影响,表明从动态效率的意义上说,从价税的效果要好于从量税。而且为了达到完全竞争时社会最优的资源代际配置,在寡占的市场结构下并不用给予厂商补贴,只要征收从价税就好。
In this paper, differential game theory is applied to analyze the behavior of double-headed oligopoly manufacturers when mining non-renewable resources. Under the assumption that firms adopt an open-loop strategy, the main conclusions obtained show that when the discrepancy between unit production costs or resource stock among firms reaches a certain level, some firms’ resources exploitation path will be similar to that of Hubbert’s Peak shape. In addition, this paper also analyzes the influence of the ad valorem tax and the ad valorem tax on the firms’ behavior. It shows that in the sense of dynamic efficiency, the ad valorem tax is better than the ad valorem tax. Moreover, in order to achieve the optimal social configuration of resources on an intergenerational basis in full competition, it is not necessary to subsidize manufacturers under the oligopoly market structure, as long as the ad valorem tax is levied.