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本文以2006—2010年我国A股上市公司为样本,研究了融资约束与投资机会的交互作用与可操纵应计利润管理之间的关系。实证研究结果表明,在投资前,存在有价值的投资机会但受融资约束的企业比存在有价值的投资机会但不受融资约束的企业有显著更高的可操纵应计利润管理行为。本文的研究重新审视了可操纵应计利润管理行为的信号作用,对盈余管理相关文献有一定的启示意义。
Based on the sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2006 to 2010, this paper studies the relationship between the interaction between financing constraints and investment opportunities and the manipulation of accruals accruals. Empirical results show that before investing, there are valuable investment opportunities but firms constrained by financing have significantly higher discretionary accruals than firms with valuable investment opportunities but not financial constraints. The research in this paper reexamines the signal function of the accruals of accruals of profit management, which has some implications for the literature on earnings management.