中国证监会在赋予发审委员审核权力的同时,没有要求其在虚假上市审核中承担责任,必然给发审委员留下寻租空间。本文用金融监管腐败模型来分析一级市场上市公司与监管部门的寻租博弈,求出均衡解并得出了相应的结论。 CSRC, while entrusting the issuance examination committee members with the power of examination, did not require them to assume the responsibility for the examination of the false listing, which inevitably left room for rent-seeking to the issuance examination committee members. In this paper, we analyze the rent-seeking game between listed companies in the primary market and regulators by using the model of financial regulation and corruption, find the equilibrium solution and draw the corresponding conclusions.