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本文用TCL整体上市的案例,讨论了管理层拥有合约主导权的前置条件,说明垄断的经理市场形态和拥有私人信息对于管理层获得更多现金流控制权的重要性。作者建立的模型说明,在管理技能的谈判地位得到市场认可,同时缺乏经理市场有效竞争的前提下,对现金流控制权的追求,导致政府对TCL集团管理层的奖励计划和整体上市的股权安排是一个非均衡安排。
In this paper, we discuss the preconditions for management to own contractual dominance in the case of TCL listed as a whole, and illustrate the importance of monopolistic manager market patterns and possession of private information for management to gain more cash flow control. The model established by the author shows that the pursuit of control over cash flow under the precondition that the negotiation status of management skills is recognized by the market and lack of effective competition in the manager’s market leads to the government’s incentive plan for the management of TCL Group and the overall listed equity arrangement Is a non-balanced arrangement.