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现管理层持股制度是为鼓励代理人追求委托人利润最大化而出现的股权激励制度,我国公司制企业的主要特点是经营权与所有权的分离,委托人和代理人之间的信息不对称导致了委托代理问题。近年来,股权激励机制在我国的实施进程不断加快,这主要得益于我国股份制改革的顺利完成。本文在探究管理层持股如何影响企业绩效的基础上,进一步分析管理层持股存在的问题,以及出现这种问题的原因,最后,本文针对管理层持股存在的问题提出相关的解决措施。
The current management shareholding system is an equity incentive system that encourages agents to pursue the maximization of the principal’s profits. The main features of the company-owned enterprises in China are the separation of management rights and ownership, and the information asymmetry between the principal and the agent. Caused the issue of commissioned agency. In recent years, the implementation process of the equity incentive mechanism in China has been accelerating. This is mainly due to the successful completion of the reform of China’s shareholding system. This paper explores how management stocks affect corporate performance, and further analyzes the problems of management holdings and the reasons for such problems. Finally, this paper proposes relevant solutions to the problems of management holdings.