利用2003-2008年上市公司数据,本文研究了管理者在职消费和员工工资之间的关系,并深入探讨了以员工工资为传导机制条件下在职消费对企业绩效的影响。本文发现,无论在国有企业还是民营企业,在职消费和企业员工工资都显著正相关,这说明管理者在职消费的同时也提高了员工工资,实证支持了“高管吃肉,员工喝汤”的社会现象。同时,本文还进一步证明,对于国有企业来说,在职消费具有激励作用,不过在职消费的激励作用随着员工工资的增加而显著降低,这说明高管给员工发放较多工资并不是以实现股东财富最大化为目标,而是建立在高管损害股东利益的基础之上,经理层为了自身利益拉拢员工会增加企业的成本。对于民营企业来说,在职消费不存在这种作用机制。 Based on the data of listed companies from 2003 to 2008, this paper studies the relationship between on-the-job consumption and employee’s salaries and discusses the impact of on-the-job consumption on firm performance under the condition of employees’ salaries. This paper finds that there is a significant positive correlation between on-the-job consumption and employee salaries both in state-owned enterprises and private-owned enterprises, which shows that managers also raise employee salaries while on-the-job consumption, and empirically supported “executives eat meat, ”Social phenomenon. At the same time, this paper further proves that for state-owned enterprises, on-the-job consumption has an incentive effect, but the incentive effect of on-the-job consumption decreases significantly with the increase of employees ’salaries. This shows that executives pay more salaries to employees than to realize shareholders’ Maximize the wealth as the goal, but based on the executives damage the interests of shareholders on the basis of managers for their own interests to draw staff will increase the cost of the enterprise. For private enterprises, on-the-job consumption does not exist this mechanism.