论文部分内容阅读
微信是一种新兴即时聊天工具,自问世以来得到迅猛发展,与此同时有关微信将向用户收费的传闻愈演愈烈,引来各方争论。本文构建了两平台两类消费者的均衡方程,分析了微信收费前后企业利润及消费者剩余的变化,进而得出收费后社会总福利受到损失的结论。进一步的,引入管制经济学的相关理论及行政垄断的成本—收益分析,解释了微信收费的不合理性。
WeChat is an emerging instant chat tool that has enjoyed rapid growth since it came out. At the same time, the rumors that WeChat will charge users have intensified and attracted controversy from all parties. This paper constructs the equilibrium equation of two types of consumers on two platforms, analyzes the changes of corporate profits and consumer surplus before and after the WeChat charges, and draws the conclusion that the total welfare of the society is lost after charging. Further, the introduction of the theory of regulatory economics and the cost-benefit analysis of administrative monopoly explains the irrational charging of WeChat.