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考虑包含一个制造商和两个供应商的两级供应链系统中,两供应商之间在碳减排研发水平上进行纳什博弈,而制造商与两供应商进行斯坦伯格博弈.构建了考虑碳减排研发技术水平溢出的博弈模型,并通过逆序求解法得到两个供应商的中间产品价格、碳减排研发水平和制造商产量,比较分析了不同竞合模式下供应链的决策及利润,并设计了一种收益共享供应链协调机制.研究表明:1)制造商与两供应商协同合作不仅可以使供应链整体利润最优,而且还能形成共赢的局面;2)技术外溢系数与制造商产量、碳减排研发水平和供应链各方及整体利润成正相关关系,与供应商中间产品价格成负相关关系;3)技术外溢系数越大,制造商利润留成比例可行范围越大.最后通过算例分析,验证了模型的正确性以及协调机制的有效性,并提出针对性的方法和建议.
Consider a two-tier supply chain system consisting of one manufacturer and two suppliers, where Nash game between two suppliers is carried out on R & D level of carbon emission reduction while Steinberg game between manufacturer and two suppliers is constructed. Carbon emission reduction R & D technology level spillover game model, and by reverse order solution method to get the two suppliers of intermediate product price, carbon emission reduction research and development and manufacturer output, comparative analysis of different competing supply chain decision-making and profit , And designs a revenue sharing supply chain coordination mechanism.The research shows that: 1) manufacturers and suppliers cooperate not only to optimize the overall supply chain profit, but also win-win situation; 2) technology spillover coefficient Which is positively related to the manufacturer’s output, R & D level of carbon emission reduction and all parties in the supply chain and the overall profit, and is negatively related to the price of suppliers’ intermediate products. 3) The larger the technology spillover coefficient is, the larger the profit margin of the manufacturer is. Finally, a case study is conducted to verify the correctness of the model and the effectiveness of the coordination mechanism, and put forward specific methods and suggestions.